Well-Being and the Priority of Values

Abstract

Personal well-being or welfare is the thing at issue when we ask after someone's best interests, when we debate what would be for someone's own good, and when we discuss what would benefit or harm someone. The theory of welfare value attempts to explain what it is that constitutes being well off or badly off, that is, what facts about well-being turn on. Consequently, it aims to specify those states or conditions that are direct ly or noninstrumentally good for a person, as opposed to those states or activities that are merely instrumentally good for a person. The concept of well-being figures prominently in contemporary con sequentialist analyses of right action, in accounts of the virtues of bene volence and kindness, in accounts of the prima facie duties of benefi cence and nonmaleficence, and in various proposals concerning distribu tive justice. The analysis of well-being is consequently important for il luminating these other concepts. Theories of well-being are commonly classified according to their degree of objectivity or subjectivity. However, there is no agreement about how precisely to characterize these qualities. That said, paradig matically objective theories of welfare assert that certain activities or ends—for example, knowledge, sociability, athletic accomplishment, the contemplation of beauty—are beneficial when pursued, even if the per son who pursues them does not want to, or does not enjoy them.1 Subjec tive theories of well-being give the subject much greater authority over what is good and bad for her. Paradigmatically subjective theories, such as actual desire satisfactionism, hedonism, and the self-assessment theory (also called the authentic happiness or life-satisfaction theory), eschew any reference to any form of objective value, and they tie well-being to a subject's actual concerns. These paradigmatically subjective theories are thought to enjoy cer tain advantages over their more objective rivals, including not only the