Abstract
A simple game ( P, W) can serve as a model of a voting system in which an alternative is pitted against the status quo. In what follows, we investigate the following three aspects of such games as they apply to four real-world examples of voting systems: a characterization of weighted voting systems in terms of the ways in which coalitions can gain or lose by trading players; the application of a graph-theoretic notion of dimension to simple games and voting systems; and the consideration of a way to measure the power of a player as an interval of real numbers. American Mathematical Society Classification Numbers: 90A28, 90D80, 05C65. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71.
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