Abstract

‘No-platforming’—the practice of denying someone the opportunity to express their opinion at certain venues because of the perceived abhorrent or misguided nature of their view(s)—is a hot topic. Several philosophers have advanced epistemic reasons for using the policy in certain cases. Here we introduce epistemic considerations against no-platforming that are relevant for the reflection on the cases at issue. We then contend that three recent epistemic arguments in favor of no-platforming fail to factor these considerations in and, as a result, offer neither a conclusive justification nor strong epistemic support for no-platforming in any of the relevant cases. Moreover, we argue that, taken together, our epistemic considerations against no-platforming and the three arguments for the policy suggest that no-platforming poses an epistemic dilemma (i.e., a difficult choice situation involving two equally undesirable options). While advocates and opponents of no-platforming alike have so far overlooked this dilemma, it should be addressed not only to prevent that actual no-platforming decisions create more epistemic harm than good, but also to put us into a better position to justify the policy when it is indeed warranted.

Highlights

  • Background and qualificationsNo-platforming is used internationally to stop a wide range of problematic speakers including individuals advocating views perceived as transphobic, anti-feminist, racist, sexist, Islamophobic, creationist, etc., from giving talks at universities (Ditum, 2014)

  • We assume that the advocates of the three arguments in favor of no-platforming to be discussed below are primarily concerned with cases other than situations involving speakers of type (1)–(3). We take these philosophers to argue that while no-platforming might be problematic in some cases, there are at least some other cases beyond those involving speakers of type (1)–(3) in which principled epistemic considerations clearly speak in favor of the policy

  • While in (2019a), Levy clearly commits to the existential claim we mentioned above, in his (2019b), he commits to the weaker claim that—if we focus only on “direct” epistemic considerations such as those pertaining to the generation of higher-order evidence—the no-platforming of a problematic speaker is sometimes justified pro tanto

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Summary

Introduction

“And when is there time to remember, to sift, to weigh, to estimate, to total?” (Tillie Olsen). In the philosophical literature relevant here it is often construed narrowly as the policy of refusing individuals the opportunity to present their views at certain venues, academic institutions such as universities, on the basis of the perceived abhorrent or misguided nature of the individuals’ views (Levy, 2019a; Simpson & Srinivasan, 2018).2 We adopt this notion of no-platforming here, and will refer to the speakers at issue as ‘problematic speakers’. Depending on the type of harm that the hosting of problematic speakers is thought to cause, at least two different kinds of philosophical arguments for no-platforming can be distinguished: moral and epistemic ones. We won’t rule out that sometimes, all-things-considered, no-platforming is justified even when it is epistemically harmful in the ways we will outline

Background and qualifications
Epistemic reasons against no‐platforming
No‐platforming reduces authentic dissent
No‐platforming weakens academic reliability
No‐platforming fuels the public’s distrust in academia
The other side: epistemic considerations for no‐platforming
The argument from misleading higher‐order evidence
The argument from preserving disciplinary knowledge
The argument from generating false moral beliefs
An epistemic dilemma
Findings
Conclusion
Full Text
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