Abstract
The spread of false information on social networks has garnered substantial scientific and popular attention. To counteract this spread, verification of the truthfulness of information has been proposed as a key intervention. Using a novel behavioral experiment with over 2000 participants, we analyze participants’ willingness to spread false information in a network. All participants in the network have aligned incentives making lying attractive and countering the explicit norm of truth-telling that we impose. We investigate how verifying the truth, endogenously or exogenously, impacts the choice to lie or to adhere to the norm of truth-telling and how this compares to the spread of information in a setting in which such verification is not possible. The three key take-aways are (1) verification is only moderately effective in reducing the spread of lies, and (2) its effectivity is contingent on the agency of people in seeking the truth, and (3) on the exposure of liars, not only on the exposure of the lies being told. These results suggest that verification is not a blanket solution. To enhance its effectivity, verification should be combined with efforts to foster a culture of truth-seeking and with information on who is spreading lies.
Highlights
The spread of false information on social networks has garnered substantial scientific and popular attention
The spread of false information on social networks has received a great deal of attention from both academic research and popular n ews[1,2,3]
Our analyses reveal that endogenous verification is a more effective intervention than exogenous verification, which is more effective than no verification
Summary
The spread of false information on social networks has garnered substantial scientific and popular attention To counteract this spread, verification of the truthfulness of information has been proposed as a key intervention. The underlying motivation behind verification is the presence of a widely held norm of truth-telling[13] This means that when false information is identified, people can be expected to make that falsity known and not spread lies, even when it goes against their self-interest. The tension between aligned interests and a wide social norm of truth-telling motivates our investigation on how well verification works and how its effectivity can be enhanced Answering this question in a field setting is fraught with challenges for at least three reasons.
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