Weapons of War: the Procurement and Stockpile of Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected Vehicles

Courtney Quinet Valera

doi:10.5070/sc61156538

Abstract

Weapons of War: the Procurement and Stockpile of Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected Vehicles

Highlights

Weapons of War: the Procurement and Stockpile of Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected Vehicles Introduction This paper will focus on the procurement and storage process implemented by the Department of Defense and various branches of the United States armed forces through an analysis of the mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicle
The mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicle is more than an armored vehicle; it is an exemplary instance of organizational interests changing the way war is waged, the ability of the United States government to spend billions, and the state of the American military fifteen years after the invasion of Iraq
The technological advancement that occurred as a result of this reconsideration led to a rapid uptick in weapons production during the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. This is most aptly summarized through the changes in weapons and tactical strategies. This shift prompted changes in both the American forces as well as the insurgent forces in Iraq as the “[adoption of] asymmetrical means and methods” prompted a type of combat that involved “avoiding enemy strengths, leveraging one’s advantages, and exploiting enemy weaknesses and vulnerabilities.”[2]. This new strategy prompted a new kind of response from the enemy; this method was meant to “[stun] the enemy into purely reactive mode.”[3]. The assumption was that the United States military would dominate any battles waged in Iraq, as well as already-occupied Afghanistan, due to its advanced weapons technology

Summary

COURTNEY QUINET VARELA

This shift prompted changes in both the American forces as well as the insurgent forces in Iraq as the “[adoption of] asymmetrical means (weapons) and methods (tactics)” prompted a type of combat that involved “avoiding enemy strengths, leveraging one’s advantages, and exploiting enemy weaknesses and vulnerabilities.”[2] This new strategy prompted a new kind of response from the enemy; this method was meant to “[stun] the enemy into purely reactive mode.”[3] The assumption was that the United States military would dominate any battles waged in Iraq, as well as already-occupied Afghanistan, due to its advanced weapons technology What this strategy failed to assume are the efforts an enemy will extend to wage their own war.[4] As a result of the invasion under the aforementioned circumstances, the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) increased at a rapid rate. “The Principle of Distinction and Weapon Systems on the Contemporary Battlefield,” Connections: The Quarterly Journal 7, no. 1 (2008): 48. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Clay Wilson, “Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq: Effects and Countermeasures,” Library Of Congress Washington DC Congressional Research Service, 2005. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Steven Lyons, e-mail response to author, November 19, 2018. 9 Ibid

Courtney Quinet Varela

Findings

There was a significant gap in the MRAP