Weapons of the Weak State: How Post-Conflict States Shape International Statebuilding

Abstract

International Organizations (IOs), such as the United Nations (U.N.), engage in statebuilding in a range of post-conflict states. Statebuilding scholarship largely assumes these IO statebuilders are the dominant authority, at least temporarily, in seemingly ``weak states. We argue, in contrast, that the post-conflict state retains authority over the IO statebuilding effort via incomplete contracts that give the post-conflict state the residual rights of control over the unnegotiated components of their statebuilding contracts with IOs. Statebuilding contracts provide procedural ``weapons of the weak state, enabling the post-conflict state to shape the content of the IO's mandate, where it intervenes, whom it hires, and when it exits. Using quantitative text analysis of U.N. Security-Council speeches, analysis of 35 U.N. interventions, and in-depth case studies, this article demonstrates the potential of statebuilding contracts to give post-conflict states power over IO statebuilders, with important implications for scholarship on statebuilding and global governance.