Abstract
The paper investigates the value changes experienced by white knights when they are involved in corporate control contests. Close to 80% of the white knights incur a negative abnormal return for the two-day window ending on the date of their bid. The losses persist for longer windows on either side of the event. We examine a set of matched-trios where all parties to the control contest are exchange-listed, and observe that from a welfare economics perspective, these contests do not lead to Pareto superior states, but meet the weaker efficiency criterion of the Hicks-Kaldor compensation principle.
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