Wealth, Power, and Authoritarian Institutions

Abstract

Abstract Through an analysis of the recent political history of Tanzania and Uganda, Wealth, Power, and Authoritarian Institutions offers a novel explanation of why authoritarian parties and legislatures vary in strength, and why this variation matters. Authoritarian political institutions reflect—and to some extent, magnify—elite power dynamics. They are a ‘terrain of contest’, an arena where power is tested, negotiated, and re-ordered. While there are many sources of elite power, the book centres on wealth, exploring how the socio-economic foundations of a regime affect its institutional landscape. This analysis first considers how diverse trajectories of state-led capitalist development shape divergent patterns of wealth accumulation across regimes. Where accumulation is more closely controlled by state and party leaders, as was true in Tanzania until economic liberalization in the 1980s, rival factions remain subdued. Ruling parties can then build up relatively strong institutional structures and parliament remains marginal. Conversely, where a class of private wealth accumulators expands, as occurred in Tanzania after the 1980s and in Uganda after the National Resistance Movement took power in 1986, rival patron–client factions can more easily form. Factional rivalries then channel through the ruling party and into the legislature, simultaneously eroding party institutions and encouraging greater legislative strength. Finally, the book reflects on the significance of a stronger legislature, particularly for distributive politics. It details mechanisms through which legislatures, as ‘terrains of contest’, contribute to both regressive and progressive redistributive outcomes. To support its analysis, the book draws on extensive fieldwork in Tanzania and Uganda.