Abstract
We analyze three tweakable enciphering schemes (TES) XCB, HCTR and HCH, which all consist of polynomial evaluation hash function as their first and third layers and CTR mode in the middle. The weak keys of polynomial evaluation hash in message authentication code and authenticated encryption have been thoroughly analyzed, but have never applied in TES. We point out that XCB, HCTR and HCH (and two variations of HCH: HCHp and HCHfp) can not resist distinguishing attack, key-recovery attack and plaintext-recovery attack once the weak key is recognized. We also analyze the security of related-key attacks against these schemes, showing that HCTR, HCHp and HCHfp suffer related-key attack and XCB and HCH can resist related-key attack under the assumption that the underlying block cipher resists related-key attack.
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