WEAK STATE INSTITUTIONS AND INSURGENCY ORIGIN IN IRAQ: A CASE STUDY OF MALIKI’S ERA

Abstract

Emergence of Islamic State (IS) in Iraq has forged havoc in country. Unlike other radicalist groups, IS is the product of socio-political and institutional nuisance, rather to be ignited by ethno-religious fracas. This paper is aimed to analyse the relationship between state institutions and society; how weak state institutions facilitate the genesis of insurgency; and how the institutional malaise created grounds for insurgency to infiltrate in Iraq? The American intervention of Iraq eroded the state vital institutions. Henceforth, the democratic transition under Maliki’s administration, despite of establishing national unity, hatched ethno-sectarian cleavage in society. Maliki’s proclivities of centralization and immature culture of political parties in running the affairs of parliament alienated the Sunni community in Iraq. Moreover, the American perception of Sunni community under Saddam Hussein further inflamed the communal discord. Such bias culminated mass exodus on the pattern of communal and sectarian bases from Bagdad to other regions of the country. Once, the ground was set for resentment against other sects, ethnicities and state, then it was easy for radicalist groups to exploit the deprived communities accordingly.