Abstract
In recent years, a criticism of “indigenous knowledge” has been that this idea makes sense only in terms of acquaintance (or familiarity) type and practical (or skills-type) knowledge (knowledge-how). Understood in terms of theoretical knowledge (or knowledge-that), however, it faces the arguably insurmountable problems of relativism and superstition. The educational implications of this would be that mere beliefs or opinions unanchored by reason(s), such as bald assertions, superstitions, prejudice and bias, should not be included in the curriculum, at least not under the guise of “knowledge”. Worthy of inclusion are skills and practical knowledge, as are traditional music, art, dance and folklore (qua folklore). Moreover, anything that meets the essential requirements for knowledge-that could in principle be included. Against this understanding of knowledge, and its educational implications, it has been contended that indigenous knowledge places no special emphasis on “belief”, “evidence” or “truth”, but that, according to indigenous practitioners, it is rather “the way” that constitutes knowledge, harmonious interaction and appropriate models of conduct. It has been argued, further, that cognitive states are (to be) seen as “maps”, as useful and practical action-guides. This is why (so the argument for “polycentric epistemologies” or “polycentric global epistemology” goes) divination, rain-making, rain-discarding, shamanism, sorcery, ceremony, ritual, mysticism, etc., must be acknowledged as ways of knowing (and as educationally valuable) alongside animal husbandry, botany, medicine, mathematics, tool-making, and the like. The present paper investigates whether the “way-based” epistemological response is a plausible reply to the “truth-based” critique of indigenous knowledge (systems).
Highlights
I came across the following story some time ago
What is “indigenous knowledge”? What accounts for its emergence during the last few decades, and what is its advocacy meant to achieve?
“knowledge” has been defined as comprising three individually necessary and jointly sufficient components: belief, truth and justification. This definition has come under some attack, mainly with regard to the interpretation and scope of the justification condition, i.e., the requisite degree and kind, as well as the context of justification
Summary
I came across the following story some time ago It is contrived (unsurprisingly; it is in the nature of jokes that they tend to be contrived), I repeat it here, because it arguably resonates with some of the central ideas this paper is concerned with. Being a practical leader, after several days he had an idea He went to the phone booth and called the National Weather Service and asked, “Is the coming winter in this area going to be cold or mild”?. The Chief went back to his people and told them to go and find every scrap of wood they can find Two weeks later he called the National Weather Service again: “Are you absolutely sure that the winter is going to be very cold”?. Can one really, and meaningfully, distinguish between “mainstream” and “indigenous” knowledge? I do not think so; and I will attempt to show in this paper why not
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