Watkins on Kant’s Laws of Nature

Janum Sethi

doi:10.1017/s136941542100008x

Abstract

AbstractI discuss three sets of worries concerning Watkins’ account of laws of nature in Kant on Laws. First, I argue contra Watkins that Kant’s laws of nature do not depend on acts of prescription in any literal sense. Second, I question how his generic conception of laws applies to empirical laws of nature and suggest that the worries about unknowability or contingency that he raises for contemporary alternatives may equally arise for empirical laws on Kant’s account. Finally, I discuss his claim that Kant’s a priori laws depend on the immutability of human cognitive capacities and ask how this immutability should be understood.

Highlights

The notion of a law figures centrally in a wide variety of contexts in Kant’s philosophical system
In Kant on Laws (Watkins ), Eric Watkins presents a rigorous treatment of the particular laws that appear in a number of these diverse contexts, while at the same time bringing into view the fundamental conception of law and lawfulness that he argues unites them
In section, I raise some worries for Watkins’ claim that, on Kant’s view, there is a literal sense in which laws are prescribed to nature

Summary

Introduction

The notion of a law figures centrally in a wide variety of contexts in Kant’s philosophical system. In Kant on Laws (Watkins ), Eric Watkins presents a rigorous treatment of the particular laws that appear in a number of these diverse contexts, while at the same time bringing into view the fundamental conception of law and lawfulness that he argues unites them. I mainly focus on Watkins’ treatment of laws of nature.

Results

Conclusion