Water Network Protection from Intentional Contamination by Sectorization

Abstract

Each single phase of a water supply network, from water adduction to distribution to end-users, is exposed to many diverse potential sources of intentional contamination (or malicious attacks). One of the most dangerous threats is a backflow attack that occurs when a pump system, easily available on the market, is utilized to overcome the pressure gradient of network pipes. In this work, a simple backflow attack with cyanide being introduced into a real-water system is modeled and the most dangerous introduction points for a contaminant incident are defined. Moreover, the network vulnerability has been analyzed by computing the lethal dose of cyanide ingested by users and the total length of the contaminated water system. Eventually the effects of network partitioning and district isolation to protect water supply systems have been investigated. The results show how district closing - by network sectorization techniques used to improve leakage search and reduction - can significantly decrease contaminant diffusion and protect part of the users from cyanide uptake. Network sectorization can also reduce the risk of simple malicious attacks because several introduction points are necessary to have a massive negative impact on the network. Simulation results also show that in some cases water network partitioning may worsen water network protection and further studies are necessary to design water districts for network security and safety.