Abstract
ABSTRACT It is well known that incumbents enjoy advantages in elections. Among others, they may use public resources to increase their electoral chances by mobilizing specific social groups to vote. In the 2020 presidential elections, the Polish government organised a competition: small municipalities with the highest turnout could win a fire truck. We exploit the threshold of 20,000 that arbitrarily divided municipalities into competing and non-competing for this public good and apply the quasi-experimental Regression Discontinuity Design. The competition aimed to increase the turnout in districts supporting the incumbent president. However, we find no evidence of any significant impact of the competition on the turnout or support for the incumbent around the threshold. We discuss why similar practices are common despite this result.
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