Waste Management in the European Union: National Self-Sufficiency and Harmonization at the Expense of Economic Efficiency?

Abstract

/ Since 1975, the European Union (EU) has developed an impressive body of waste management legislation, although, according to the principle of subsidiarity, responsibilities belong to the most local level at which the tasks can be carried out effectively. Using economic theory, this paper examines several factors that influence the efficient distribution of regulatory authority among the EU and the member states. We specifically analyze the role of harmonization that, in our opinion, will often lead to an overcentralization. Within this context, a second issue is becoming more important, as ongoing discussions show. If no consensus can be reached about harmonization, should member states be allowed to stop cross-border shipments of waste, or should the EU strive for a common market for waste? We take the position that most objections against waste shipments are not convincing, especially if the member states implement minimum standards for landfills and waste processing facilities and common information and control systems. Competition between different national regulations within adequate constraints that, e.g., control transboundary externalities leads to more efficient waste management structures in Europe than national self-sufficiency or centralized decision-making at the EU level. KEY WORDS: Waste management; European Union; Subsidiarity; Institutional competition; Harmonization; Cross-border shipments of waste