Was Wittgenstein a radical conventionalist?

Abstract

This paper defends a reading of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics in the Lectures on the Foundation of Mathematics as a radical conventionalist one, whereby our agreement about the particular case is constitutive of our mathematical practice and ‘the logical necessity of any statement is a direct expression of a convention’ (Dummett in Philos Rev 68(3), 1959, p. 329). On this view, mathematical truths are conceptual truths and our practices determine directly for each mathematical proposition individually whether it is true or false. Mathematical truths are thus not consequences of a prior adoption of a convention or rules as orthodox conventionalism has it. The goal of the paper is not merely exegetical, however, and argues that radical conventionalism is able to withstand some of the most difficult objections that have been brought forward against it, including those of Dummett himself, and thus that radical conventionalism has been prematurely excluded from consideration by philosophers of mathematics.