Abstract
Drafts, reports and protocols from a legislative procedure may include hints as to what the legislature intended with a specific wording. However, in legal practice, often various interpretations compete with each other. Surprisingly enough, specialised courts as well as the Federal Constitutional Court lack a set of universal criteria of what type of proof, exactly, may substantiate „legislative intent”. Employing recent findings from social philosophy and political science, however, may lead to a useful approximation of such a „legislative intent”. This work shows its explanatory value as well as its limits. The notion works as a key concept to assess, weight and categorise statements from legislative materials and may serve as a means to establish a „micro-methodology” for dealing with them.
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