Abstract

At face value, it could be argued that, during the pandemic, UK Government policymaking (like that in some other countries) came close to being evidence-based, in the sense that it drew on virological and epidemiological evidence about the spread of the virus, as well as on a broader range of scientific evidence about what measures were likely to be successful in dealing with it. I consider what this case can tell us about the complexities and limits of evidence-based policymaking, and about the conditions required if closer approximation to a model of rational decision-making drawing on scientific evidence is to be achieved. In particular, I examine: problems caused by uncertainties surrounding scientific evidence and advice; issues to do with the channels of communication by which scientific information reached policymakers; the fuzzy interface between evidence and grounds for policy action; and the contextual factors that affected both its reception and its production – in particular, the role of interests and ideology.

Full Text
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