Abstract

The near consensus in the secondary literature on Feyerabend is that his epistemological anarchism, characterized by the slogan ‘anything goes’, was not a positive proposal but the conclusion of a reductio argument against his opponents (Lloyd 1997; Staley 1999; Munévar 2000; Farrell 2003; Tsou 2003; Oberheim 2006; Roe 2009). This makes anarchism a mere criticism rather than a substantive position in its own right. In this paper, I argue that Feyerabend held anarchism as a positive thesis. Specifically, I present two possible interpretations of anarchism: one where anarchism is entailed by Feyerabend's radical view of pluralism and another where scientists must be ‘methodological opportunists’, which Feyerabend held simultaneously from at least 1970. I then consider how these positions fare against the more influential criticisms of anarchism (Nagel 1977; Worrall 1978; Godfrey-Smith 2003). I conclude by suggesting two avenues to constraining a literal interpretation of ‘anything goes’ on Feyerabendian grounds.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call