Abstract
This paper challenges the view of Jeremy Bentham as a primitive predecessor of rational choice theory and welfare economics. The psychological hedonism in Bentham is of a rather weak form – net pleasure motivates behaviour, but we are not always capable of its maximisation. Thus, the outcome of our choices is not necessarily in our best interest and the aggregation of our revealed preferences is not necessarily a good indicator of general happiness. The bottom line is that the underpinnings of Bentham's utilitarianism are better aligned with contemporary psychological theory than previously thought, which puts his ethical thinking on firmer ground.
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