Warrior- scholars in the United States Marine Corps: from the small wars in the Caribbean to the ‘three block war’ and beyond

Abstract

When one pictures the archetypal US Marine one is more likely to think of a ‘grunt’ infantryman attacking against all odds than of a scholar in quiet contemplation in his library. There was certainly no room for nuance while storming the beaches at Saipan or breaking out of the encirclement at the Chosin Reservoir. When First Sergeant Dan Daly and his men were pinned down and heavily outnumbered at Belleau Wood in 1918 he didn’t organise a seminar to think through the problem; he exhorted them out of the trenches shouting (according to legend) ‘Come on you sons of bitches! Do you want to live forever’?1 At first glance, then, it would appear strange to devote a chapter to the notion of warriorscholarship in such an organisation. But despite its reputation, the Marine Corps has encouraged innovation, particularly in the field of counterinsurgency. This being the case, it is therefore of merit to adopt an institutional approach in the analysis of the emergence of warrior-scholars within its ranks. This chapter will look at four warrior-scholars, spanning three specific periods in the development of counterinsurgency doctrine in the Marine Corps; the early ‘small wars’ period of the first half of the twentieth century; the Vietnam War in the ‘classical counterinsurgency’ period of the 1950s and 1960s; and finally the post-Cold War era of asymmetric warfare. The first warrior-scholar, Colonel ‘Red Mike’ Edson was largely responsible for the Marine Corps’ early counterinsurgency doctrine and laid the foundations for those who were to follow. The second, General Victor Krulak, sought to apply what he had learned from contemporary thinkers, such as Sir Robert Thompson, to the Marine Corps’ strategy in Vietnam. The last two, Generals Charles Krulak and Paul Van Riper, saw that the modern battlefield after the end of the Cold War was becoming increasingly complex and multi-dimensional, requiring greater independence of thought and strategic understanding at all levels. In their own way, these last two used their influence to try to create an entire Marine Corps of professional warriorscholars. Why, then, has the Marine Corps generated such warrior-scholars? What is it about this organisation that enables it to produce these officers despite an apparent anti-intellectual mindset? Part of the answer lies in an old joke told by Marines and quoted in General Victor Krulak’s memoirs. On 10 November 1775, the first two Marines to enlist are drinking in the Tun Tavern when onesays to the other, ‘They’re after us, they’re after us!’ The second Marine asks ‘Who’s after us?’ The first Marine replies, ‘The Army and the Navy, that’s who!’2 The Marine Corps has almost constantly had to fight for its own existence and for its budget. At least twice in the last hundred years the Corps has almost been legislated out of existence. The Corps was actually abolished at the end of the War of Independence, to be reconstituted in 1798.3 In 1830 and 1867 the Corps was saved by the Navy, who argued that they needed the Marines as ships’ guards, gun crews and landing parties.4 In 1909, a suggestion that the Marines be amalgamated into the Army was fought off by some fairly aggressive political action by the Marines.5 In 1947 the Marines nearly lost their organic air assets, and much of their manpower, in the proposed National Security Act that would have seen them return to their nineteenth century role of simply providing landing parties for the Navy, although some within the military establishment wanted the Corps abolished completely. This time the Marines mobilised a team of officers, which included (at the time) Brigadier General ‘Red Mike’ Edson and Colonel Victor Krulak, to prepare a defence that the Commandant could put to Congress. Eventually the Marines won the day and preserved its service intact, with its air assets and full responsibility for all amphibious doctrine and operations.6 It can, therefore, be seen that the Marine Corps has needed its warriorscholars to help fight these battles for its own existence. The Marines have to continually prove their relevance and be able to meet unexpected challenges. The continual evolution of counterinsurgency strategy has been part of this struggle for existence. It sits at the crux of two key issues for the Marines: first, their need to innovate in order to remain relevant and, second, the desire to find an area of expertise that no other part of the armed forces provides.