Warmaking and American Democracy: The Struggle over Military Strategy, 1700 to the Present

Abstract

While war is most effectively waged as a united effort, the United States has consistently waged military conflict without firm central direction. Throughout our history, observes Michael Pearlman, the waging of war has been subject to continuous bargaining and compromise among competing governments and military factions. What passes for strategy emerged from this process. This book represents a study of American war strategy in its political context. It aims to show how internal divisions - between political parties, presidents and Congress, elected representatives and bureaucrats, soldiers and civilians, and branches of the armed services - make the creation of strategy extraordinarily complex and explains why wartime goals, ways and means often seen disconnected. The author reveals how divided America has always been over warmaking, from colonial times to Desert Storm. Drawing on a wide array of sources in politics, military and diplomatic history - as well as interviews with leading figures in the defence establishment - he illuminates the strengths and weaknesses of our convoluted decision-making process through examples of wartime successes and failures, and he explains many of the dysfunctions of high-level strategy making. Pearlman compares the military thinking from different eras and points out the recurring difficulties of presidents and commanding generals to compose a common strategy. Disagreements between LBJ and the Joint Chiefs of Staff over how to conduct the war in Vietnam was similar to disputes between Wilson and Pershing, or Lincoln and Grant. Pearlman also provides a wealth of fresh insights into our major conflicts - notably the Civil War, World War II and Vietnam - and shows how the experience of one war can influence strategy in the next.