Warfare and Logistics along the US-Canadian Border during the War of 1812 by Christopher Dishman

Abstract

Drawing from a wide array of archival and secondary sources, Dishman’s analysis of the War of 1812 takes a close look at the combat along the United States–Canadian border. His focus is on the military dimension of the war, more specifically the logistical challenges faced by the two combatants. Dishman’s central argument is that the key factor in the fighting was the difficulties that both sides faced in moving men and materials into the Great Lakes border region on a reliable and timely basis. The British had a long, horizontal supply line stretching from the St. Lawrence valley westward through the Great Lakes and western Ontario. The vulnerability of this line was obvious to American strategists, but it was never fully severed due to the chronic manpower and supply problems that Americans faced, caused chiefly by the lack of roads in the region.Dishman’s close look at a specific theater of the war and the logistical problems intrinsic to the region is both the strength and weakness of the book. The well-written and nicely paced narrative makes a clear contribution to an understanding of the war for scholars with a foundation in this field. Whereas historians often emphasize the lack of American preparedness for the war and the poor performance of its aging generals, Dishman instead argues convincingly that despite those points having some validity, those conditions were not determinative in the Americans’ overall failure to successfully invade Upper Canada and sever its supply lines. He gives the Americans credit, however, for holding their own in the ongoing naval struggle for Lake Ontario and Lake Erie, based on an effective ship-building program and good leadership from officers such as Commodore Oliver Perry. He also gives credit to the British military leaders whose actions were heavily constrained by the tenuousness of the long supply lines that, in some sense, led all the way back to England.The book provides a detailed and compelling story of the thrust and parry of two foes making the best of relatively poor military situations. The British and Americans traded victories and defeats, but none were conclusive enough to change the basic equation of the wider war. Fighting in the United States–Canadian borderland theater ultimately resulted less in a stalemate than in a rough equilibrium that had much to do with negotiators in Europe choosing to settle the entire conflict as essentially a draw.The limitation in Dishman’s approach is the absence of much in the way of political or cultural background. He touches briefly on Americans’ aversion to a standing army and to federal taxes as hindrances to the cause, along with the outright refusal of most state militias to cross state borders or the Canadian border. More discussion about these issues, as well as about the Republican–Federalist divide and the economic differences between U.S. states and regions would have helped to establish the context for the fighting at the border. In the same vein, Dishman underserves the Native Americans involved. He mentions them but does not adequately cover their specific connection to the war and the significance of their betrayal by their British allies. In contrast, Dishman’s recurring references to the demands that the Napoleonic wars placed on the British military demonstrate the effectiveness of widening the scope of a significant, though relatively narrow, frame of analysis.The War of 1812 is famously misunderstood and much-maligned, certainly in the U.S. and even more in the European historical literature. This monograph argues persuasively for the importance of long and tenuous supply lines, certainly not a glamorous topic but a useful one for scholars of this period, demonstrating that this war was anything but short, insignificant, or dull.