Abstract
This article examines the implementation of the War Powers Resolution in the light of more than ten years of practice. The Resolution has three functional components: a prior consultation requirement, reporting requirements, and combat termination provisions. Each component is examined in turn and found to be wanting according to the standard of intent as defined. Nevertheless, the Resolution is shown to be in some ways an effective mechanism. It is argued that, in the future, construction of a system of sharing the War Powers between the President and Congress will be based on a strengthening of the existing law including some form of the legislative veto.
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