War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives (review)

Abstract

146 SAISREVEEW seized to exist in 1948, the elements of a de facto state, complete with the three requisite legal characteristics, were maintained in the diaspora. In reconstructing Palestinian history since 1947, Brand could have provided more dataregarding the legal status ofthe Palestinians inthehoststate. Additional illustrations of inequitable legislation or public policy enacted to differentiate the Palestinian population from non-Palestinians would have provided the readerwith a more in-depth comprehension ofthe level ifdiscrimination faced by Palestinians. Furthermore, since the case studies are presented by country, rather than chronologically , the reading can be slightly disjointed. In general, however, this book is a valuable contribution to Middle East studies and to the understanding of the Palestinian social, economical and political history. War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives. By Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992 322pp. $40.00/Hardcover. Reviewed by Alan Kessler, Department ofPolitical Science, UCLA. The question of whether a nation's foreign policy goals are set by the anarchic international systemordriven largelyby domesticpolitics isoftenposedbutseldom answered convincingly by scholars ofinternational relations. With the publication ofBruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman's WarandReason, this is no longer the case. The authors construct a game-theoretic model ofinternational interactions in which realist and domestic perspectives are formalized and empirically tested, and conclude that "the optimistic views of foreign policy reflected in notions that domestic rivalry ends at national borders cannot be supported by the evidence we have uncovered." Howthe sequence ofactions taken by states may lead to conflict or cooperation is of central concern in Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's analysis. The authors' international interaction game is designed to capture the consequences ofcountervailing actions by rivals. In the game, a state favored by circumstances finds itself in the position to either make a demand on its rival or to forgo making a demand. In the realpolitik variant of the game, the magnitude of any demand is chosen to maximize the state's expected utility within the international context, without regard fordomestic political considerations. In the domestic variant, themagnitude ofany demand is determined primarily by domestic political factors that are exogenous to the international setting. Demands are accompanied by the threat offorce, and, according to the authors, may be about anything so long as the two players can attach value to them. If adversaries forgo making demands upon one another within the context of the international interaction game, the lack of immediate conflict leads to a continuation of the status quo. If, however, either state makes a demand upon its rival, the potential for military conflict arises as players involved in what the author's term crisis games must decide whether to carry out their (implicit or explicit) threats to use force. The possible outcomes ofthe game include the status quo, acquiescence to a rival's demand, negotiation, capitulation following an opponent 's use offorce, and war. The bulk ofWarandReason, consequently, is devoted to BOOK REVIEWS 147 proving an array oftheorems and corollaries regarding the necessary and sufficient conditions for each outcome to be a possible equilibrium, testing the game's deductions against the historical record, and exploring the implications of the game for both international relations theory and foreign policy. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's international interaction game is well-specified and richly described. The proofs are presented in a straightforward manner as are the empirical tests ofcompeting propositions. It is the game's implications, however, that are most striking for international relations theory and policy. The authors find scant support for the realpolitik variant of their game. In fact, in the case ofcomplete information the authors prove that only the status quo or negotiation can occur under realist assumptions (as they identify them). War can, however, occur in equilibrium in the domestic variant of the game, even under perfect information—affirming once again that misperceptions or lack of information are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for war. The authors note that the domestic version of the game is both "more believable than the implication from the realist point ofview" and better supported by the empirical evidence. They also advance and test propositions concerning the relevance of norms for international cooperation...