Abstract

The “laws” postulated by Maurice Duverger and Giovanni Sartori on the connection between electoral and party systems can be tested by looking at the young democracies in post-communist Eastern Europe. Their electoral systems are categorized by type as well as by the predicted strength of the concentration effect. It emerges that in countries with less structured party systems the concentration effect is stronger with proportional representation systems employing national election thresholds than with majority voting systems in single member districts. Such unstable party systems are common among countries in Eastern Europe. While Duverger’s laws are too simplistic to account for the situation in these countries, Sartori’s theory is more applicable due to its emphasis on party structures. However, the latter also falls short because the effects of national election thresholds are neglected. This neglect might be explained by the fact that the thinking of most authors has been influenced by the presence of relatively stable party systems in Western countries.

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