Abstract
The paper discusses the economics of promotion and, in particular, studies wage and employment structure in an economy with internal labor markets. It is shown—under a wide range of assumptions—that firms will set a nondecreasing wage profile that, for reasons apparently not suggested before, both junior and senior workers may be paid more or less than their marginal product, and that firms will offer a flat wage schedule if labor hours are supplied perfectly inelastically.
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