Vygotsky and Piaget: Scientific concepts

Abstract

Introduction: Basic distinctionsJean Piaget's perspective is often compared with Lev Vygotsky's because both authors acknowledged the active role of humans in the construction of knowledge. However, they differ in that, unlike Piaget, Vygotsky thought that the assimilation of new information does not have to wait for an appropriate level of development but must, on the contrary, produce that development: organization of scientific concepts in children constitutes an important practical problem for schools (Vygotsky, 1934/2007, p. 222).Piaget framed his cognitive theory in biological context, repeatedly referring to his intellectual roots in Immanuel Kant's, C. H. Waddington's, and Henri Bergson's thoughts, as well as focusing on evolutionism and structuralism. He based his orientation and his psychogenetic theory on five principles: reason is rooted in action; it stands on two a priori mechanisms, adaptation and organization; reason is pure and non-temporal; structuralism is an independent concept.Piaget seems to have been mostly interested in spontaneous concepts. In his research, he stated that the development of formal reasoning and scientific concepts depends on the experience of cognitive conflict, which promotes imbalance, thus forcing the emergence of successive new assimilations. The reorganization of thought then takes place naturally. This description of the development of higher mental functions has been designated nonhistorical in opposition to Vygotsky's historical, or cultural, understanding.Vygotsky's work was strongly influenced by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, by Charles Darwin's evolutionism, and by Spinoza's dynamic insights on universal development. Based on the ideas of these philosophers he defined the five distinctive principles that should orient epistemological research: psychology is the science of historical human being; higher psychological processes originate in social action; there exist three distinct classes of mediators: signs/instruments, individual acts, and interpersonal relationships; specific functions as well as social reality emerge from transformational acts or work; there exists fundamental unity between body and mind--that is, people global beings.According to Vygotsky, spontaneous and scientific conceptual structures both develop through continuous interaction between individual partners in an historical context and don't result from cognitive conflicts between two thought processes. In his view, spontaneous and scientific concepts belong to dialectical unity and become organized together along opposite paths: spontaneous concepts proceed from the concrete to the abstract; scientific concepts, from the abstract to the concrete.Spontaneous concepts primarily inductive, nonsystematic, and based on perceptual attributes; they embody elementary aspects of experienced reality and imbued with life and dynamics. In turn, scientific concepts, culturally formulated and transmitted, provide structure; they elevate the horizon of consciousness and its ponderings. Scientific concepts grow downward through the involvement of spontaneous concepts; spontaneous concepts grow upward through the use of scientific concepts. In Vygotsky's words:By forcing its slow upward trajectory, an everyday concept paves the way for scientific concept and its descendant development. It creates series of structures necessary for the evolution of the most primitive and elementary aspects of concept, giving it body and vitality. Scientific concepts, in turn, provide structures for the upward development of spontaneous concepts in relation to consciousness and deliberate use by the child. (1934/2003, pp. 93-94)Thus, everyday concepts emerge from dealings with concrete situations: these concepts are ontological, intuitive categories developed by each individual not counting on formal schooling. Consequently, they nonsystematic, qualified by contextual situations, their associations being affected by concrete analogies or related to isolated generalizations (Damazio, 2000, p. …