Abstract
The idea of “anti-vulture legislation”, i.e. domestic law dealing with holdout strategies and “vulture” litigation against a sovereign debtor in financial distress, differs radically from existing and proposed approaches to deal with sovereign debt crises, such as the contractual approach and the proposal for an international sovereign debt restructuring mechanism. Anti-vulture laws adopted in Belgium, in the United Kingdom and, more recently, in France offer an ambitious local solution to a global problem. Motivated by these developments, we investigate the actual or hypothetical advantages attached to anti-vulture legislation compared to other approaches, and we argue that legislative interventions in sovereign debt-enforcement regimes should be made cautiously with the aim of promoting timely, orderly and equitable solutions to sovereign debt crises.
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