Vulnerabilities and Attacks on CAN-Based 3D Printing/Additive Manufacturing

Abstract

Recent advancements in 3D-printing/additive manufacturing has brought forth a new interest in the use of Controller Area Network (CAN) for multi-module, plug-and-play bus support for their embedded systems. CAN systems provide a variety of benefits that can outweigh typical conventional wire-loom protocols in many categories. However, implementation of CAN also brings forth vulnerabilities provided by its spoofable, destination-encoded shared communication bus. These vulnerabilities result in undetectable fault injection, packet manipulation, unauthorized packet logging/sniffing, and more. They also provide attackers the capability to manipulate all sensor information, commands, and create unsafe operating conditions using only a single compromised node on the CAN network (bypassing all root-of-trust in the modules). Thus, malicious hardware requires only a connection to the bus for access to all traffic. In this paper, we discuss the effects of repurposed CAN-based attacks capable of manipulating sensor data, overriding systems, and injecting dangerous commands on the Controller Area Network using various entry methods. As a case study, we also showed a spoofing attack on critical data modules within a commercial 3D printer.