V.—The Myth of Sense-Data

Abstract

Our knowledge of the physical world is subject to many doubts and uncertainties but we commonly see no reason to doubt certain facts. We all agree, when we are out of the study, that we sometimes see tables and chairs, hear bells and clocks, taste liquids, smell cheeses, and feel the woolen vests that we wear next to our skin in winter. To put the matter generally, we agree that we perceive physical objects, physical objects being such things as tables, chairs and cheeses, and perceiving being a generic word which comprehends the specific activities of seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, and feeling. These activities are invariably directed upon an object or objects; and this fact distinguishes them from other activities of ours—if that be the right word—such as feeling pained or feeling tired, which go on entirely within ourselves. We take it for granted that by means of the former activities we become aware of the existence, and acquainted with the qualities, of physical objects, and we further regard the kind of acquaintance which we acquire in this way as a basis for the far reaching and systematic knowledge of the physical world as a whole, which is embodied in the natural sciences. Let us call experiences such as seeing a table, hearing a bell, etc., perceptual experiences; and the statements which assert the existence of such experiences perceptual statements. Many philosophers have cast doubt upon the claims made by such perceptual statements. They have produced THE MYTH OF SENSE-DATA 139