Abstract
We study the effect of public information on collective decision-making in committees, where members can have both common and conflicting interests. We show that in the presence of public information, the information aggregated via voting can be extremely limited under the commonly-used simultaneous voting rules, due to the non-existence of a simple and intuitive efficient equilibrium and the existence of a simple and intuitive but inefficient equilibrium. We propose a voting procedure that takes into account the content of the public information, and show that it can facilitate information aggregation by restoring the efficient equilibrium. Our voting procedure also has additional advantages when there is a concern for strategic disclosure of public information.
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