Abstract
In this paper, we study the voting power in the Council of Ministers of the EC. The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to evaluate the voting power for the member states of today's Community and, second, to analyse the balance of power after two different enlargements of the Community. The analysis is based on the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf power indices of simple cooperative games. The modified version of the Shapley-Shubik index is used to analyse how the sub-systems of the EC can change the distribution of power in the decision making process.
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