Abstract
The article discusses the development of a voting power theory that is applied to a unique data set on Swedish shareholder meetings. The authors hypothesize that there is a positive relationship between shareholder activism and the largest shareholder's sensitivity to greater participation by small shareholders. It is shown that firms' amenability to small shareholder influence results in more proposals by nomination committees that are dominated by large shareholders, but fewer proposals by other shareholders. The importance of local institutions are highlighted and a call for more research regarding shareholder activism in alternative institutional settings is made.
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