Abstract
This paper extends the median voter result of Meltzer and Richard (1981) to the case where a labor economy has any constant returns to scale production function under quasilinear preferences with constant wage elasticity. Average productivities of the different labor inputs depend on their relative abundance in the economy. Agents are heterogeneous due to their labor type and (given type) due to their relative efficiency. They vote over income tax rates which in turn dictate the level of redistribution. The paper shows that preferences over tax rates are single-peaked and hence the median voter theorem applies. This framework connects the scarcity of inputs to the most preferred tax rates.
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