Abstract
This paper investigates the efficiency of voting for provision of transportation infrastructure such as highways, and discusses the effect on regional structure. The salient conclusions of this study show that voting and political competition engender overprovision of large-scale transportation infrastructure. In addition, consideration of industrial location reveals that the provision of transportation infrastructure exerts a negative effect on development of rural areas.
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