Voting behaviour under doubts of ballot secrecy: reinforcing dominant party rule

Abstract

ABSTRACT Ballot secrecy is a cornerstone of electoral democracy, since its real or perceived absence can make voters reluctant to express their true preferences. Through survey data from Singapore, we show that doubts over ballot secrecy can alter voting behaviour even when the vote is secret and there are no individually-targeted punishments or incentives; specifically, they lead a small subset of Singaporean voters to support the dominant party, despite a preference for the opposition. We also examine individual-level correlates of doubting ballot secrecy: a tendency towards belief in conspiracies and distrust of the mass media are the strongest predictors. Finally, a counterfactual exercise demonstrates the sensitivity of election outcomes to marginal vote swings; it suggests that doubting ballot secrecy can secure the dominant party a small number of additional parliamentary seats, thereby buttressing dominant party rule without requiring any concerted action or overtly repressive measures.