Voting behaviour in a system of concordant democracy

Abstract

There are many distinctive variations of the system of representative democracy. One possible method to classify these systems is to do so firstly according to the electoral system, secondly according to the number of parties that compete against each other and thirdly according to the way conflicts are resolved in parliament. With regard to electoral system, one usually differentiates between singlemember constituency voting systems (majority systems) and the system of proportional representation. Concerning the number of parties criterion, the most important point is whether only two or whether several parties court the voters' favour. These two distinguishing criteria are not entirely independent of each other. On the one hand, a majority system favours the large parties, which leads to a consolidation of the parties and, in time, to a two-party system. On the other hand, under a system of proportional representation, it is comparatively easy to gain a seat in parliament, and this is after all the main goal of every politician. Under a proportional system of representation, there is therefore a tendency towards the multiplication of parties. In the theory of Public Choice, no attention has been paid to date to the third distinguishing criterion. It should therefore be described at somewhat greater length. In most countries, a party or a coalition of parties forms the government, which is generally backed by a majority in parliament. The govenment submits to parliament bills which reflect the program of the governing party or coalition. These bills are generally passed by parliament as all members of the governing party or coalition vote for the bill on account of the strong party discipline. All that remains for those members of parliament who are not in the governing party or coalition to do is to exert a watchdog role in opposition. This variation of representative democracy, in which as a rule