Abstract
This paper contrasts voting behavior in multicandidate elections between the proximity and the directional spatial models of electoral competition. Under the traditionalproximity spatial model, a voter's utility for a candidate is a declining function of distance between their respective positions. Under thedirectional spatial model, introduced by Rabinowitz and Macdonald, utility is specified as the scalar product of the vectors representing voter and candidate. The present paper specifies and compares regions of candidate support for the two models and for several voting procedures. The degree to which each model and voting system favors extremist versus centrist candidates is assessed. It is shown that a pure directional model implies that candidates lying in the interior of the convex hull of the other candidates receive no support under the single-vote plurality procedure. A one-parameter family of mixed proximity and directional models may provide more plausible descriptions of voter behavior than either pure model.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
