Abstract
This paper explores electoral accountability in a legislative system favoring seniority, using laboratory experiments. Voters face a trade-off between pork-barrel transfers and policy representation. The experiment tests term limits as a mechanism to reduce the cost of searching for a candidate who better represents voters on policy. I use subjects´ preferences on abortion to capture incumbents´ policy choices where subjects vote to determine whether a donation is allocated to a pro-choice or to a pro-life nonprofit to create tension between visceral and monetary incentives. I find term limits to be effective, but not infallible, for avoiding the seniority trap.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
