Abstract
In this paper, I explore the effects of electoral competition and the size of the electorate on outcomes of grassroots elections, examining China’s village elections. China’s authoritarian regime has allowed, encouraged, and required elections to be held at the village level, but not at higher levels. Using a simple game-theoretic model, I suggest a logic that can account for how introducing elections at the grassroots level is consistent with the survival strategy of the authoritarian regime. At equilibrium, electoral competition would increase the probability of vote buying in a smaller electorate, while it may decrease the probability of vote buying in a larger electorate. In other words, electoral competition gives strong incentives for candidates to buy votes, but not to form an organization for mobilizing votes in a smaller electorate. Hence, the apparently democratic institution of grassroots elections would not threaten the survival of an authoritarian regime.
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