Von der Empfindung zum Ding an sich – Idealismus-Kritik bei Kant und Riehl (mit einem Ausblick auf den amerikanischen Realismus des frühen 20. Jahrhunderts)

Abstract

Abstract Alois Riehl was one of the few Kantian-inspired philosophers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century who argued for a realist approach to Kant’s original doctrine. He therefore rejected prevailing idealist reconstructions and attempted to establish a view of Kant as an important forerunner of what he programmatically called ‘critical realism.’ In the present paper it will be shown what this exactly meant for the interpretation of Kant’s and especially Riehl’s own critique of idealism as a systematic position. In particular, it is stated that anti-idealism in Riehlian terms amounts to a ‘realistic rehabilitation’ of Kantian things-in-themselves. Furthermore, some connections are drawn to early-twentieth century American realism.