Abstract
This paper models how a nation's military manpower procurement system affects popular support for war and political choices regarding war. When citizens have idiosyncratic benefits from war and costs from serving, I characterize when a volunteer military maximizes support, and when a mixture of volunteer and conscripted forces does. Pure conscription never maximizes support. The personnel systems cannot be ranked ex-ante by efficiency, because each makes mistakes the other avoids. Ceteris paribus, political systems requiring only weak support to initiate wars have more war under pure conscription, while those requiring strong support have more war under a volunteer system.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
