Volunteer Assisted Collaborative Offloading and Resource Allocation in Vehicular Edge Computing

Abstract

As a promising new paradigm, Vehicular Edge Computing (VEC) can improve the QoS of vehicular applications by computation offloading. However, with more and more computation-intensive vehicular applications, VEC servers face the challenges of limited resources. In this paper, we study how to effectively and economically utilize the idle resources in volunteer vehicles to handle the overloaded tasks in VEC servers. First, we present a model of volunteer assisted vehicular edge computing, in which the cost and utility functions are defined for requesting vehicles and VEC servers, and volunteer vehicles are encouraged to assist the overloaded VEC servers via obtaining rewards from VEC servers. Then, based on Stackelberg game, we analyze the interactions between requesting vehicles and VEC servers, and find the optimal strategies for them. Furthermore, we prove theoretically that the Stackelberg game between requesting vehicles and VEC servers has a unique Stackelberg equilibrium, and propose a fast searching algorithm based on genetic algorithm to find the best pricing strategy for the VEC server. In addition, to maximize the reward of volunteer vehicles, we propose the volunteer task assignment algorithm for optimal mapping between the tasks and volunteer alliances. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed scheme is demonstrated through a large number of simulations. Compared with other schemes, the proposed scheme can reduce the offloading cost of vehicles and improve the utility of VEC servers.