Abstract
We revisit the adoption of voluntary export restraints (VERS) in the differential Cournot game with sticky price and intraindustry trade by Dockner and Haug (Can J Econ 3:679–685, 1991). The analysis relies on linear and nonlinear feedback strategies, to encompass the special cases considered in Fujiwara (Aust Econ Pap 49:101–110, 2010). We show that a VER may arise in correspondence of any free trade equilibrium generated by feedback information, when the intensity of competition is at least as strong as under open-loop information. The adoption of a VER by a foreign firm also benefits the domestic firm, yielding an outcome which has a definite collusive flavour. The foreign firm’s incentive to adopt the VER can be interpreted in the light of the dynamic formulation of conjectural variations due to Dockner (J Ind Econ 40:377–395, 2010).
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
