Voluntary appointment of independent directors: evidence from Taiwan

Abstract

PurposeUsing a data set of Taiwanese listed firms from 2002 to 2015, this paper aims to examine the determinants to voluntarily appoint independent directors.Design/methodology/approachThis study uses panel estimation to exploit both the cross-section and time-series nature of the data. Further, this paper uses Tobit regression, generalized linear model (GLM) in the additional analysis and the two-stage least squares to mitigate for a possible endogeneity issue.FindingsThe main findings show that Taiwanese firms with large board sizes tend to voluntarily appoint independent directors and firms that already have independent supervisors more willingly to accept additional independent directors onto the board. Furthermore, ownership concentration and institutional ownership are positively associated with the voluntary appointment of independent directors. On the contrary, firms controlled by family members are generally reluctant to voluntarily appoint independent directors.Research limitations/implicationsThe findings are important for managers, shareholders, creditors and policymakers. In particular, when considering the determinants of the voluntary appointment of independent directors, the results indicate that independent supervisors, outside shareholders and institutional investors are significant factors in influencing effective internal and external corporate governance mechanisms. This research work focuses on the voluntary appointment of independent directors. It would be interesting to compare the effectiveness of voluntary appointments with a mandatory appointment within Taiwan and with other jurisdictions.Originality/valueThis study incrementally contributes to the corporate governance literature in several ways. First, this study extends the earlier research by using a more comprehensive data set of non-financial Taiwanese firms and using alternative methodologies to investigate the determinants of voluntary appointment of independent directors. Second, prior studies tend to neglect the possible issue of using a censored and fractional dependent variable, the proportion of independent directors, which might yield biased and inconsistent parameter estimates when using ordinary least squares regression estimation. Finally, this study addresses the relevant econometric issues by using the Tobit, GLM and the two-stage least squares for a possible endogeneity concern.