Abstract

The article deals with the topic of electoral design, reforms, and engineering in the post-Yugoslav state entities between 1990 and 2015. First, it briefly conceptualizes a theoretical framework, drawing on the work by Katz, Shugart and Renwick. Second, it describes the evolution of electoral design and reforms to the main chambers in particular systems in detail. Third, it analyses and compares common trends in electoral reforms and design. Proportional representation (PR) list systems have been used for almost 90 % of all 60 elections (a PR list had been adopted by the fourth elections in all the systems). There have been 29 reforms in total (avg. 3.6 per entity), 1/5 of them major and 4/5 minor. Major reforms took place in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and in Serbia (one each) and in Croatia and Macedonia (two each). There have, however, been no major electoral reforms in Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, or Kosovo. Minor reforms have been present in all entities (the most in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro, the least in Kosovo and Slovenia). While major reforms were primarily used to correct parts of political systems perceived as dysfunctional, one third of minor reforms were used for intentional electoral engineering. Generally, post-Yugoslav electoral design can be considered unstable, with frequent electoral reforms by the state entities (avg. every 4.7 year). Each system also introduced its specific approach to national minorities, which facilitated their representation in the main chambers.

Highlights

  • The article deals with the topic of electoral design, reforms, and engineering in the postYugoslav state entities between 1990 and 2015

  • Proportional representation (PR) list systems have been used for almost 90 % of all 60 elections

  • The first direct elections in 1990 were not held to the federal parliament, but only to the assemblies of the federal republics

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Summary

Konceptualizace výzkumného rámce

K základní typologizaci volebních reforem lze využít kombinace analytických přístupů Richarda Katze, Matthewa Shugarta a Alana Renwicka. V Chorvatsku, Srbsku, Černé Hoře a Makedonii k reformě volebního systému postačuje pouze nadpoloviční většina všech poslanců hlavní komory, doplněná v případě Bosny a Hercegoviny a SCG44 o další podmínky. Pokud by bylo zavedení volebního designu pro první přímé volby považováno za reformu, tak by se podle Katzovy klasifikace jednalo ve všech případech o velké reformy, protože došlo ke změně typu volebního systému. Volební design byl kromě SRJ ve všech případech velkých reforem flexibilního typu; k reformě volebního systému tedy postačovala nadpoloviční většina hlasů všech poslanců, což umožnilo poměrně hladké prosazení volebních reforem.. Ve SRJ byl sice volební design rigidního typu (nutný souhlas dvou třetin poslanců obou komor), ale z důvodu bojkotu předešlých voleb opozicí nebylo rovněž obtížné reformu prosadit. Státní entita Rok voleb Pořadí voleb Původní VS Nový VS Ústavní design Volební design

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