Vůle a její relevance pro právní filozofii

Abstract

The article deals with the will and related legal issues. It first discusses the historical development of the concept of will and then looks at other issues relating to it, such as its freedom. It shows the different ways in which the definition of will has been approached, and also explains how contemporary scholarship has approached the question of its freedom. In particular, the text mentions the problem of personhood as one that is related to the question of the will in contemporary legal philosophy. To be able to grant rights to someone (whether human rights in the sense of moral rights or subjective rights in general), some theories recognize as a relevant criterion precisely the will of the agent, or also its freedom. The author argues, however, that we have neither a clearly accepted definition of the will nor a generally accepted explanation regarding its freedom. This then generally puts us on thin ice when we base theories of legal personhood or laws that affect peopleʼs lives on this concept.