Visual Object Agnosia without Alexia or Prosopagnosia: Arguments for Separate Knowledge Stores

Abstract

We review the points raised by Farah (this issue) in her discussion of the paper by Rumiati, Humphreys, Riddoch, and Bateman (1994), in which a case study was presented of a patient, Mr W., with visual object agnosia without either prosopagnosia or alexia. We reiterate the argument that Mr W. had impaired stored knowledge about the visual characteristics of objects, and that this was more severe than his deficit at a semantic level. In addition, we summarize supporting evidence from another patient (Humphreys & Rumiati, submitted), who showed the same pattern of breakdown as Mr W. We suggest that stored visual knowledge can be specific to the form of stimulus (words, objects, and faces), that these different forms of knowledge may be represented in distinct neural areas, and that agnosia can result after damage to stimulus-specific sites of knowledge representation.