Visions of Democracy

Abstract

Germany’s partition after 1945 and its subsequent unification in 1990 captivate social scientists for a number of reasons, but one dominant factor is undoubtedly that these events reflect Germany’s tenuous commitment to a democratic system. In particular the collapse of the Weimar Republic in 1933 and the establishment of the Nazi regime epitomise the lack of a strong democratic tradition in Germany. When the Second World War ended in Germany’s defeat, the three Western occupational forces embarked upon the enormous task of ‘democratising’ West Germany. Given Germany’s totalitarian heritage and the reluctance of many Germans to endorse a liberal-democratic system, large parts of the German citizenry — the mass public as well as elites — had to be politically reeducated in order to make the second democracy more viable than the first one had been (Merkl, 1963). This was a monumental task. We know from social scientific surveys conducted after the Second World War that it was approximately two decades before a substantial majority of West Germans unequivocally supported liberal-democratic values. Because the Allies supported the reconstruction of the political system and because the economic miracle cushioned the political system from critical attitudes toward it, the Bonn democracy was stabilised and eventually succeeded in remaking Germany’s political culture (Baker et al. 1981). Especially during the 1970s and 1980s, the growth of political activities — social movements, citizens’ initiatives and the like — suggested the presence of a viable democratic political culture. By most accounts, West Germany had evolved into a stable liberal democracy by the time the Berlin Wall fell in 1989.